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FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PRIVILEGE FOR
ADVERSE SPOUSAL TESTIMONY VESTED IN WITNESS
SPOUSE-Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)
INTRODUCTION
The marriage relationship gives rise to two distinct privileges
in the federal courts.' One, the privilege for adverse spousal testi-
mony, allows a party to exclude the adverse testimony of his or her
spouse.' The other, the privilege for marital communications, pro-
tects confidential communications made to one's spouse during the
marriage.3 The privilege for adverse spousal testimony is used pri-
marily in federal criminal procedure, but there is some authority
that the privilege for adverse spousal testimony applies to civil ac-
tions.4 The modern justification for the privilege for adverse
spousal testimony is the encouragement of harmony and peace in
the marital relationship.
The privilege has common law origins5 but has been subject to
sharp criticism over the years. McCormick labeled the privilege
"arbitrary and misguided," and Professor Wigmore called the
privilege "the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefen-
sible obstruction to truth in practice. ' '7 The United States Su-
preme Court considered the justification and purpose of the privi-
lege for adverse spousal testimony in Trammel v. United States.8
That Court held that in the federal criminal courts the witness
spouse alone has the privilege to refuse to testify adversely.9 For-
merly, the adverse testimony was barred unless both spouses con-
1. F. SALTZBURG et al, FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 208 (2d ed.
1977).
2. Id.
3. See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); Wolfle v. United States,
291 U.S. 7 (1933).
4. Ryan v. Comm'r, 568 F.2d 531, 543 (7th Cir. 1977); Gilles v. Del Guercio,
150 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
5. 8 J. WIGMOm, EVIDENCE § 2333 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
6. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 66 (2d
ed. 1972).
7. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2228.
8. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
9. Id. at 53.
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sented.10 In the opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court con-
cluded that such modification of the privilege would further "the
public interest in marital harmony without unduly burdening legit-
imate law enforcement needs."'I
THE CASE
On March 10, 1976, Petitioner, Otis Trammel, was indicted for
importing heroin into the United States from Thailand and the
Philippine Islands and for conspiring to import heroin in violation
of 21 U.S.C. sections 952(a), 962(a) and 963.12 Petitioner's wife,
Elizabeth Ann Trammel, was named as an unindicted co-conspira-
tor. In a pretrial motion, petitioner asserted his claim to a privilege
to prevent his wife from testifying against him. At a hearing on the
motion, Mrs. Trammel testified that she and petitioner had been
married since 1975. She then related both her role and her hus-
band's role in the heroin distribution conspiracy and explained
that her cooperation with the government was based on a grant of
immunity from prosecution. The district court held that she could
testify as to any act observed during the marriage and to any com-
munication made in the presence of a third person. However, the
court did exclude evidence of confidential communnications be-
tween the petitioner and his wife. At trial, Mrs. Trammel testified
within the court's pretrial limitations and petitioner was found
guilty on both charges.' 8
On appeal, Trammel argued that the admission of his wife's
adverse testimony was contrary to the rule set forth in Hawkins v.
United States. 4 The Hawkins decision provided that testimony of
one spouse against the other in a federal criminal action is inad-
missible unless both spouses consent to such testimony. 5 The gov-
ernment argued that the testimony of Elizabeth Trammel was ad-
mitted properly because both spouses participated in the unlawful
enterprise. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court holding with one judge dissenting.' The United States
10. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
11. 445 U.S. at 53.
12. Edwin Lee Roberts and Joseph Freeman were indicted also for importing
heroin and for conspiring to import heroin.
13. 445 U.S. at 43.
14. 583 F. 2d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 1978).
15. 358 U.S. at 74.
16. 583 F.2d at 1171.
[Vol. 3:125
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Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the validity of the
Hawkins rule.'7 The Court concluded that the existing Hawkins
rule should be modified so that the witness spouse alone has the
privilege to refuse to testify adversely.' 8
BACKGROUND
The privilege against adverse spousal testimony originated at
common law as one branch of a two-pronged rule of exclusion.' 9 In
1628, Lord Coke stated that "it hath beene resolved by the Jus-
tices that a wife cannot be produced either against or for her hus-
band."' 0 Thus, at common law, the rule of exclusion included the
privilege against adverse spousal testimony and the disqualifica-
tion of a husband or wife to testify on behalf of his respective
spouse. The common law courts recognized the privilege-disqualifi-
cation distinction but considered the two rules as one unit in judi-
cial opinions over the years."1
The privilege branch of the common law rule was not without
exception. In trials for crimes of physical violence committed by
one spouse against the other, adverse spousal testimony was ad-
missible without the consent of both parties. Without such excep-
tions, the common law courts felt that strict application of the
privilege would permit one spouse to harm the other in private
without fear of prosecution.'
The federal courts recognized the two-part rule of exclusion in
the nineteenth century. 3 Then, in Funk v. United States,4 the
United States Supreme Court abolished the disqualification for
spousal testimony on behalf of the other spouse in the federal
courts. In an opinion by Justice Sutherland, the Court reasoned
that since defendants were allowed to testify in their own behalf,
there was no reason to prevent them from using their spouses for
the same purpose.2'5 Any danger of false testimony by the witness
17. 445 U.S. at 41.
18. Id. at 53.
19. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5 § 2227.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at § 2239.
23. See Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893); Stein v. Bowman, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 209 (1839).
24. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
25. Id. at 381.
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spouse was minimal due to the test of cross-examination.2 Thus,
one branch of the two-pronged common law rule was eliminated.
The other branch has been limited by exceptions and judicial
constructions. The first exception to the privilege was established
in Herman v. United States." The Herman court held that the
privilege would not bar adverse spousal testimony where the defen-
dant spouse commits a crime affecting the property of the witness
spouse. *
Hawkins v. United States reaffirmed the validity of the privi-
lege against adverse spousal testimony in the federal criminal
courts.2 9 The Hawkins decision provided that in the federal crimi-
nal courts testimony of one spouse against the other is barred un-
less both consent.3 In the opinion by Justice Black, the Court con-
cluded that the privilege was necessary to foster family peace, not
only for the benefit of the husband and wife, but also for the bene-
fit of the general public.31 Relying on Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 2 Justice Black stressed that the Hawkins
decision did not foreclose future changes in the privilege which are
dictated by "reason and experience."33
Three important exceptions to the privilege for adverse
spousal testimony developed after Hawkins. The first was estab-
lished in Wyatt v. United States.3 In Wyatt, the Court held that
a husband-defendant may not prevent his wife from testifying
against him in a Mann Act 85 prosecution where the wife is the vic-
tim of the offense.36 The second exception to the privilege, estab-
26. Id. at 380.
27. 220 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956); see United
States v. Graham, 87 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Mich. 1949).
28. 220 F.2d at 226 (the defendant in Herman fraudulently converted cash
and jewelry owned by his wife).
29. 358 U.S. 74.
30. Id. at 78.
31. Id. at 77.
32. FEr). R. CRiM. P. 26 (1948): "The admissibility of evidence and the com-
petency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Con-
gress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and
experience."
33. 358 U.S. at 79.
34. 362 U.S. 525 (1960).
35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421, 2422 (1976).
36. 362 U.S. at 526. The Court declined to expand this exception to apply to
criminal acts other than Mann Act violations. Since 1960, one federal court has
applied the exception to criminal acts other than Mann Act violations. E.g.,
128 [Vol. 3:125
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lished in United States v. Allery,87 allows adverse spousal testi-
mony where one spouse commits a crime against the children of
either spouse. The third exception to the privilege was established
in United States v. Moorman." The court in Moorman held that
the privilege could be waived by the defendant spouse in the fed-
eral courts.8 9
ANALYSIS
In Trammel v. United States, the Supreme Court modified
the existing Hawkins rule and placed the privilege for adverse
spousal testimony exclusively in the witness spouse. 40 The Court
held that when the spouse is called to testify, the spouse may
neither be required to testify nor prevented from testifying against
the defendant spouse. Relying on Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence," the Court concluded that "reason and experience" no
longer justified so broad a rule as established by the Court in Haw-
kins.42 In deciding to limit the rule, the Trammel Court balanced
the societal interest in preserving marital harmony against the so-
cietal need for probative evidence in criminal trials.48 The Court
felt that vesting the privilege in the witness spouse would foster
marital harmony without frustrating justice."
Five important factors influenced the Court to modify the
privilege for adverse spousal testimony. First, support for the priv-
ilege has diminished among the states. In the twenty-two years be-
tween the Hawkins and Trammel decisions, seven jurisdictions
abolished or revised the privilege.45 The Court found this point sig-
nificant because states traditionally are charged with developing
the law of marriage and domestic relations.'6 Second, the privilege
Grulkey v. United States, 394 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Smith,
533 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1976).
37. 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975).
38. 358 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 866 (1966).
39. Id. at 33. See United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 1976);
Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954
(1964).
40. 445 U.S. at 53.
41. FED. R. Evm. § 501.
42. 445 U.S. at 53.
43. Id. at 51.
44. Id. at 53.
45. Id. at 48.
46. Id. at 50.
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for marital communications remains in effect in the federal crimi-
nal courts.4 7 Thus, information privately disclosed between hus-
band and wife is still privileged. Third, the privilege against ad-
verse spousal testimony can be invoked by defendants to exclude
evidence of criminal activity and communications made in the
presence of third persons."8 In comparison, the privileges between
attorney and client,4' priest and penitent," and physician and pa-
tient"1 protect only private communications.5 2 Fourth, modern so-
ciety no longer denies women a legal existence. The common law
concept of husband and wife as one person is no longer valid in
any jurisdiction." Finally, when one spouse agrees to testify
against the other in a criminal trial, the privilege is unjustified be-
cause there is probably little marital harmony to preserve." These
five factors convinced the Court to modify the Hawkins rule and to
shape a privilege that strikes a balance between competing societal
interests.
The Supreme Court rejected the reasons advanced by the
court of appeals. That court had relied heavily on two points to
support its holding that Mrs. Trammel's testimony was admissi-
ble.55 The first point was the fact that Otis Trammel and his wife
Elizabeth had participated jointly in the criminal conspiracy.56 The
other was that Elizabeth Trammel had testified under a govern-
ment grant of immunity.5 7 The Supreme Court ignored the first
point and hardly mentioned the second." Instead, the Court used
the Trammel case as a vehicle to bring the privilege more in line
with current legal trends.
Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion indicated that "rea-
son and experience" had not worked a drastic change since Haw-
kins.5 Stewart pointed out that "[tihe fact of the matter is that
-the Court in this case simply accepts the-very same arguments that
47. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
48. 445 U.S. at 51.
49. E. CLEARY, supra note §§ 6, 87, 89, 91.
50. Id. at § 77.
51. Id. at §§ 98, 101.
52. 445 U.S. at 51.
53. Id. at 52.
54. Id.
55. 583 F.2d 1169-70.
56. Id. at 1169.
57. Id.
58. 445 U.S. at 54.
59. Id. at 914.
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the Court rejected when the Government first made them in the
Hawkins case in 1958. '60 Justice Stewart had expressed support
for modifying the privilege in the Hawkins decision but felt Haw-
kins was not the proper situation in which to make the change.'
Contrary to Chief Justice Burger, Stewart felt that the ancient
foundations for the privilege disappeared long before 1958 and not
within the interim between Hawkins and Trammel.'2
CONCLUSION
Trammel modified the privilege against adverse spousal testi-
mony in the federal criminal courts and placed the privilege exclu-
sively in the witness spouse; thus, "the witness may be neither
compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying." Under the
old Hawkins rule, testimony of one spouse against the other was
barred unless both consented." Such modification of the privilege
strikes the best balance between the competing interests of pre-
serving marital harmony and securing accurate trial results. As a
matter of self-interest, a defendant spouse usually will seek to pre-
vent adverse spousal testimony regardless of the effect on marital
harmony. In almost every case, the Hawkins rule ignored the inter-
est in accurate trial results. Vesting the privilege in the witness
spouse provides a proper middle ground between the interest of
marital harmony and the need for probative evidence.
Support for the former privilege among the states probably
will continue to diminish. Relying on Trammel, the North Carolina
Supreme Court recently held that spouses are competent to testify
against one another in a criminal proceeding." Spouses are still
incompetent to testify against one another in a criminal proceeding
if the substance of the testimony concerns a "confidential commu-
nication" between the marriage partners made during their
marriage."
James Quimby Wallace, III
60. Id.
61. 358 U.S. at 81-82.
62. 100 S. Ct. at 914.
63. Id.
64. 358 U.S. at 78.
65. State v. Freeman, No. 99 - Mecklenburg (N.C. April 7, 1981).
66. Id. at 5.
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